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ABSTRACT
As the world’s largest payments for ecosystem services (PES) program, China’s Sloping Land
Conversion Program (SLCP) is designed to combat soil erosion and land degradation by convert-
ing cropland on steep slopes into forests. Operating through an incentive-based approach, the
SLCP involved 32 million rural households as core agents. This paper aims to fill a research gap
regarding how socioeconomic and institutional conditions influence rural households to reach
the primary environmental goals. Using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), we
conclude that at the household level, the different pathways to environmental success or failure
have been shaped by socioeconomic and institutional conditions in a combinatorymanner rather
than single conditions alone. Specifically, the combination of household involvement and
effective monitoring plays a fundamental role in capacity-building between government and
households. We found that financial incentives have a trade-off effect, as they could not only
create a positive interaction but also trigger failure in situations with different conditions. Finally,
the potential and limits of QCA were discussed, and we call for a more serious reflection on the
added value of QCA as an alternative or complementary method to conventional approaches in
environmental governance research.
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1. Introduction
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) has been
a popular approach to address environmental degrada-
tion in recent years. The principle of PES is to use an
economic incentive tomotivate voluntary local actors to
protect and restore valuable ecosystem services (Engel
et al. 2008). As PES is not a panacea, how to make PES
the right tool has attracted considerable attention.
Notably, by summarizing 70 PES programs worldwide,
Wunder et al. (2018) argue that four theoretical pre-
conditions and three desirable design features should
enable PES to achieve success. However, based on
a review of PES design features, Engel (2016) claimed
that the evidence on the effectiveness of PES is still
scarce and rather mixed.
The Chinese Sloping Land Conversion Program
(SLCP), initiated in 1999, is considered one of the largest
governmental PES programs in the world due to its broad
geographic cover, wide participation and tremendous
investment (Zhen and Zhang 2011). This program
aimed to reduce soil erosion and support rural economic
development by reforesting approximately 14.67 million
hectares of cropland countrywide (State Forest
Administration 2003). With an explicit emphasis on
voluntary participation and local autonomy in the policy’s
design, the SLCP directly engaged over 32 million house-
holds as core agents of program implementation (State
Forest Administration 2007). Although embracing inno-
vative PES elements, similarly to other governmental
schemes, the SLCP contains components from the tradi-
tional command-and-control approach, such as top-
down structure, inflexible contract design and campaign-
style mobilization (Kolinjivadi and Sunderland 2012).
Thus, an open question remains concerning whether the
SLCP is an institutional innovation or just ‘business as
usual’ (Bennett 2008).
The success of economic incentive instruments
depends on the capacity to target the self-interest of the
final agents – the households (Liang et al. 2012; Li et al.
2017). Various socioeconomic and institutional condi-
tions, including household attitude, trust, household
involvement, household livelihood, property rights clar-
ification, off-farm labor allocation, and regular monitor-
ing, were considered important factors to create the
incentive and shape the behavior (Uchida et al. 2005;
Bennett 2008; Cao et al., 2009a). Their influence on rural
households’ willingness to participate in SLCP was inten-
sively studied (Démurger and Pelletier 2015; Li et al. 2017;
Liu et al. 2019). Many studies had linked those factors
with program implementation, poverty alleviation, cost-
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effectiveness and long-term sustainability (Uchida et al.
2009; Gauvin et al. 2010; König, Podhora et al. 2015).
Many studies had extensively investigated the various
impacts of the SLCP on the participating households,
such as their household income (Lin and Yao 2014),
livelihood diversification (Liu and Lan 2015), agricultural
production activities (Yao and Li 2010; Liu and
Henningsen 2016), labor transfer (Yao et al. 2010) and
productivity (Liu and Lan 2018). The studies shed light on
the factors that affect the program implementation and
rural household livelihood. While many longitudinal
household databases had provided comprehensive analy-
sis of the livelihood impact of the SLCP, the dependency
of the primary environmental goal on socioeconomic and
institutional conditions at the household level has rarely
been explored. In particular, what determinants influ-
enced the final environmental effectiveness and efficiency
at the household level has until now been unclear.
The environmental effectiveness of SLCP is
mixed. Environmental effectiveness at the household
level refers to the quantity and quality of forest in
SLCP-enrolled plots (The State Council 2002).
Officially, the most important indicators used to
evaluate the outcomes are tree survival rate and
canopy coverage1. While the governmental national
evaluation result shows 93% acceptance after inspec-
tion (State Forest Administration 2007), many filed
studies cast doubt upon the accuracy and reliability
of that assessment (Bennett 2008; Trac et al. 2013;
He and Sikor 2015). In contrast, several studies
found great forest cover improvement in extensive
SLCP-enrolled regions by using remote sensing
(Zhou et al. 2009; Zhang et al. 2017). Nevertheless,
SLCP could not take all the credit, as private com-
mercial afforestation increasingly dominates the
expansion of tree cover (Frayer et al. 2014).
Additionally, the aggregated regional result may
neglect significant differences by individual house-
hold and locale (Bennett et al. 2014). Therefore,
scientific field observation of the official indicator
is important to justify the SLCP-induced environ-
mental outcome at the individual household level.
However, due to the difficulty in collecting the filed
data in the remote mountainous area, the criticisms
of the environmental effectiveness of SLCP primar-
ily relied on secondary data, such as household self-
reported information and governmental inspection
results (Bennett 2008; Bennett et al. 2014; He and
Sikor 2015). Only a handful of filed observations are
available, but they are not up to date (Cao 2008; Cao
et al. 2009b). To offer direct and detailed evidence,
further local case studies and field-based data collec-
tion have been called for (Trac et al. 2007).
While there have been several studies devoted to
addressing the link between socioeconomic and
institutional conditions with the environmental
effects of the SLCP (Bennett 2008; Yin and Zhao
2012; He et al. 2014; Zhang et al. 2017), they have
not explicitly clarified the interactions between socio-
economic and institutional conditions and environ-
mental outcomes at the same household level. To fill
this research gap, the objective of our paper is to
analyze the relation between relevant socioeconomic
and institutional conditions and environmental effec-
tiveness at the household level. We target the follow-
ing research questions:
● What are the necessary and sufficient2 socioeco-
nomic and institutional conditions at the house-
hold level for environmental effectiveness?3
● What are the necessary and sufficient socioeco-
nomic and institutional conditions at the house-
hold level for environmental effectiveness and
environmental noneffectiveness4?
2. Analytic framework
Our research is structured using a combination of meth-
ods. After selecting the case study, we selected and defined
the conditions based on the literature and local interviews.
Then, we collected data by a second household interview
and field observation. After calibration of the data, we
employed a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis
(fsQCA) to determine the different pathways to success
and failure in terms of environmental effectiveness among
varied condition arrangements. Figure 1 gives an overview
of how we proceeded with our analysis.
Socioeconomic and 
institutional conditions
Field observation of tree 
canopy coverage
Environmental effects
CalibrationFuzzy-QCA 
Pathway to success
The selection of study cases and conditions
Household interview
Pathway to failure
Figure 1. Analytical framework.
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3. Selection of case study area and conditions
3.1. Selection of study cases
As a typical target region of the SLCP, Jingyuan County
from the Guyuan Region in the Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region (Figure 2) was selected as the
study region. Located at the southern tip of the Loess
Plateau, JingyuanCounty is in a remote, environmentally
fragile mountainous frontier region. The county is
defined as a national key ecological function zone and is
one of the most undeveloped areas in China. Shengli
village and Miaowan village were purposely selected
because both villages implemented two rounds of the
SLCP, with significant tree plantations and extensive
involvement of the local households since 2000. To
answer our research question, individual households in
both villages were selected as our study cases, and their
environmental effectiveness for SLCP-enrolled land was
defined as the outcome.
Another reason for us to select these two villages is the
similarity of their environmental settings. In general,
environmental conditions (e.g. soil, precipitation, and
temperature) are important determinants of environ-
mental outcomes. Of course, for an individual plot, the
micro-environmental conditions are different, especially
considering the variation under climate change.
However, the land areas in the two villages are categor-
ized into three classes according to biophysical conditions
(e.g. slope, soil, access to water and plot size) and traffic
conditions (e.g. distance to home). To make the overall
quality of land allocated to each household nearly equal,
one household normally has 3–6 plots that include all
three classes.Due to the targeting strategy, SLCP-enrolled
plots are mostly in the worst class, with the worst bio-
physical and traffic conditions. By selecting the SLCP-
enrolled plots in the two villages, we consider that our
sample has beennaturally controlled for the environmen-
tal aspect. This assumption was also confirmed by the
local forest experts. Our first field trip in 2014 observed
that one frequently sees two neighboring plots with simi-
lar environmental conditions but completely different
results due to differentmanagement strategies.We there-
fore believe that for our study cases, environmental con-
ditions may play only a limited role in determining
different environmental outcomes across different
households.
3.2. Selection of relevant conditions
Consistent with the PES theory and international
experience, the environmental success of SLCP
depends on a variety of conditions. As only a limited
number of conditions can be considered for valid
inferences by QCA, we assumed that some key condi-
tions are most relevant for the program’s environmen-
tal effectiveness. To avoid subjectivity, we selected the
most relevant ones through three steps. Step 1 listed the
potential conditions through a broad search based on
studies. The literature study began with socioeconomic,
institutional and environmental aspects that are gener-
ally assumed to be important within the SLCP litera-
ture. The review, conducted by the first author (Chen
et al. 2015) in 2015, includes 164 international scientific
articles; additional studies were updated in 2017. As
Figure 2. Location map of Jingyuan County in Guyuan region, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.
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a result, 20 relevant conditions were found. Step 2
shortened the list by merging similar conditions into
more-general conditions based on local household
interviews. Finally, Step 3 selected the most relevant
conditions according to a local expert workshop.
Detailed information about this process can be found
in A1, the condition selection protocol, in the supple-
mentary material. The final selected socioeconomic
and institutional conditions are summarized in Table 1.
3.2.1. Household involvement
The SLCP claimed to be decentralized, and voluntary
households were to be free to choose their site to retire
and choose tree species to plant (The State Council
2002). However, during implementation, household
participation was not entirely voluntary and was
observed in a passive manner (Li et al. 2017). When
a region was targeted by the governmental general plan,
individual households can hardly have a say in the
enrollment decision (Démurger and Pelletier 2015).
Therefore, we viewed the participation by using the
broader term, ‘involvement.’ By our definition, house-
hold involvement included being part of the general
planning, site selection and tree species selection and
of the satisfaction of the decision results.
3.2.2. Financial incentives
For SLCP households, behavioral changes are highly
conditional on the governmental payment. Economists
viewed the financial incentive based on the opportunity
costs (Uchida et al. 2005). However, it is important to
consider household resources when analyzing real beha-
vioral changes. Furthermore, the payment amount varied
according to the enrolled land size and environmental
outcome. Therefore, we define the financial incentive
based on the household’s comparison between the cost
required by the SLCP (farmland loss, replanting respon-
sibility and obligation to be monitored) and payment
received.
3.2.3. Off-farm labor allocation
A household’s position within agriculture and off-farm
labor markets has a complicated impact on the program
implementation (Uchida et al. 2009). The effect of off-
farm labor allocation has been studied intensively but
remains unclear. Many scholars have argued that the
shifting from on-farm activities to off-farm employment
can offer the household better economic opportunities
(Yao et al. 2010; He et al. 2014). Therefore, this transition
was considered key to ensuring the converted land is not
returned to cropland (Groomet al. 2010).However, other
evidence shows that off-farm households do worse at
keeping their planted trees alive (Bennett et al. 2011).
The percentage of land-related income (farming, garden-
ing and livestock breeding) that accounts for total income
is chosen as the measure for off-farm labor allocation.
3.2.4. Property rights
Demsetz (1967) noted that different patterns of property
rights could lead to different patterns of behavior, and Tu
et al. (2011) found that property rights are generally
considered to influence SLCP household behavior
regarding resource use and environmental management.
Moreover, secure property rights played an important
role when payments were terminated by encouraging
households to pursue off-farm employment (Grosjean
and Kontoleon 2009; Yin and Zhao 2012). However,
there are increasing concerns about the uncertainty over
the lack of property rights in rural China due to the
separation of land property rights and use rights5
(Uchida et al. 2005). Since we are interested in the incen-
tive for households to provide environmental effects, the
measure of property rights focuses on household percep-
tion about trees and land rather than the legal property
status.
3.2.5. Effective monitoring
Effective and lasting monitoring, particularly internal
monitoring and enforcement, has been understood as
a major component of SLCP implementation (Yin
et al. 2013). While monitoring was widely accepted
as the core of PES design, how to implement mon-
itoring cost-effectively remains unclear (Ezzine-de-
Blas et al. 2016). As we consider the monitoring
from the perspective of households, household aware-
ness of the checking standard and the appearance of
monitoring officials are used as measures.
4. Data and methods
4.1. Data collection – socioeconomic and
institutional conditions
Data collection was done during our second field trip in
2015. Thirty households in Shengli village and 29
households in Miaowan village were onsite sampled,
totaling approximately 10% of the households in both
villages. The survey targeted the household head as the
Table 1. Definition of the five conditions.
Condition Code Category Definition
Household Involvement ‘invo’ Institutional Household is involved in decision making in program implementation
Off-farm labor allocation ‘off’ Socioeconomic A majority of income comes from off-farm employment
Financial incentive ‘fina’ Socioeconomic Household feels the payment is attractive compared to the required input
Property rights ‘prop’ Institutional Household recognizes property rights for trees and land
Effective monitoring ‘moni’ Institutional Household is aware of the checking standard and has been effectively monitored
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person viewed as knowing the most about his/her
household. Apart from basic household characteristics,
the interview focused on the five conditions and their
measures. In addition, interviews with the village head
and local forest officials helped to verify the results from
the households.
The subjective impacts from the interviews, such as
strategic answers, influence of the interviewer and mis-
interpretation were seriously considered and carefully
addressed. The interviews were conducted face-to-face
by a team led by the first author. Since 2014, this teamhas
worked in Jingyuan County, particularly in the two study
villages. The team included three PhD students from
a research group at the Institute of Geographic Sciences
and Natural Resources Research (IGSNRR), Chinese
Academy of Sciences. All team members were trained
on relevant conditions and correspondingmeasures. The
existing mutual trust and well-prepared knowledge
enabled the interviews to be conducted with minimum
communication difficulty.
4.2. Data collection – measurement of
environmental effects
Tree survival rate was used as themost explicit indicator
for evaluation for pragmatic reasons (Bennett 2008).
However, it is often criticized by household and local
forest officials because survival rate counts the quantity
of the trees rather than the quality of the forest. To
equally consider the quantitative and qualitative perfor-
mance, we therefore evaluated environmental effective-
ness at the household level by using the Braun-Blanquet
method to scale the tree canopy coverage. The Braun-
Blanquet cover-abundance scale is a widely used
method for ecological studies (Braun-Blanquet 1932)
that provides sufficiently accurate baseline data to
allow environmental impact assessment in terms of
species, estimation of relative abundance, estimation
of foliar coverage and density measurement (Wikum
and Shanholtzer 1978).
Due to land fragmentation and lacking information,
applying remote sensing and GIS to measure the envir-
onmental effects for our sampled households is not sui-
table. The field work was very challenging but appeared
to be the only option. We collected field-observed data
from 128 SLCP-enrolled plots (Figure C1 and C2 in the
supplementary material) owned by our 59 interviewed
households. Eachhouseholdwasmeasured by at least two
different located plots because of land fragmentation.We
randomly placed a 100 m2 quadrat with the steel tape
within the plot during the middle of the growing season
(August and September). In order to eliminate accidental
in selection, the sample quadrat from the sample plot was
checked by our local guide (local farmer specialized in
forest management). Species diversity, species number,
tree height and coverage were collected according to the
Braun-Blanquet table (Braun-Blanquet 1932). The
Braun-Blanquet cover-abundance scale was recorded by
the authors’ estimation in the quadrat. To make our
estimation more accurate and objective, we confirmed
the scale by counting the number of each tree species in
the quadrat. Finally, we adapted the scale with the
Chinese forest regulations (Table 2) (General
Administration of Quality Supervision 2006). The envir-
onmental outcome was categorized ‘forest’, ‘sparse for-
est’, ‘developing forest or grass’ or ‘re-farm’ (Figure C3 in
the supplementary material). According to the Chinese
forest regulations, the first two categories are considered
forest, and the other two categories are not. Therefore,
a coverage ratio of 10% is used as the threshold to distin-
guish environmental success and failure at the household
level (Table 2). We acknowledge that we are not seeking
to precisely quantify the environmental effects. Instead,
we want to make an estimation of the relative abundance
of forest for further outcome comparisons. Given the
current availability of data and facility at the household
level, the cover-abundance scale in a sample quadrat is an
appropriate measure for examining the household-level
environmental effectiveness.
As our study case is the individual household, the
field observation data from 128 SLCP-enrolled plots
need to be aggregated into 59 households. When one
household’s plots have the same result (45 of 59), they
can be easily unified. When one household’s plots had
different results, a participatory process with the village
head was carried out to make a decision based on the
overall performance during the previous local inspec-
tion. If re-farm is observed in any of the plot, the out-
come of the household is labeled as re-farm (9 of 59).
4.3. Data analysis by qualitative comparative
analysis
To compare the 59 households, we employed qualitative
comparative analysis (QCA) to determine the different
pathways to environmental success and failure among
varied condition arrangements. QCA, which is based on
Boolean logic, allows comparison between cases and at
Table 2. Conversion of Braun-Blanquet cover abundance scale to SLCP scale.
Braun-Blanquet scale Coverage ratio SLCP scale Coverage ratio
3–5 >25 Forest 20%-100%
2 10–25 Sparse forest 10%-20%
1 <10, numerous individuals Developing forest 5%-10%
+ <10, few individuals Grass 0–5
R <10, no individuals Re-farm 0, crop or nursery planting
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the same time offers a detailed understanding of the
complexity of each case, particularly in small or med-
ium-sized samples (Ragin 2008). QCA is particularly
powerful in analyzing multiple conjunctural and asym-
metrical causation (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). Multiple
conjunctural causation means that 1) not one factor but
a combination of factors will lead to the outcome; 2)
different combinations of factors can produce the same
outcome; and 3) one condition can have different
impacts on the outcome, depending on its combination
with other factors and the context. The justification for
considering QCA as an appropriate method for our
study can be found inA2 in the supplementarymaterial.
Hypotheses within QCA are implication hypotheses
of the notions of necessity and sufficiency (Ragin 2008).
A condition is necessary if, whenever the outcome is
present, the condition is also present. A condition can
be interpreted as sufficient, if always whenever the con-
dition is present, the outcome is also present. The QCA
analyses presented in this paper were conducted with
fsQCA 2.0 software (Ragin 2008). The software used the
truth table to sort the condition data into the different
logically possible combinations. When applying the logi-
cal minimization procedure to the truth table rows, three
solution terms are produced: the complex solution, the
parsimonious solution and the intermediate solution.
With no simplifying assumption, a complex solution
avoids using any counterfactual cases (remainder).
Parsimonious solutions, on the other hand, permit the
use of any remainder that will yield the simplest recipes.
An intermediate solution is something in between; it uses
only the remainders that survive counterfactual analysis
based on theoretical and substantive knowledge. The
researcher is free to choose the solution for substantive
interpretation depending on the balance between com-
plexity and parsimony (Ragin 2008). Finally, to explain
inconsistencies, contradiction analysis is used to explore
why some of the cases covered by the sufficient condition
exhibit the outcome and others do not.
The comparison of QCA and classical regression ana-
lysis (e.g. binary logistics) is by far a mixed result (each
has merits and drawbacks). As this study does not intend
to compare the methods, readers can find a detailed dis-
cussion in the works of Seawright (2005), Grofman and
Schneider (2009) and Vis (2012). We acknowledged that
this method is only briefly introduced in this section of
this paper. Our recent publication explains how QCA
could be applied in institutional analysis for PES and
illustrates five basic steps for such application (Meyer
et al. 2018). In Ragin (2008, 2014) and Schneider and
Wagemann (2010, 2012) provide handbooks, user guides,
explanations and standards of good practice regarding
this method. Nevertheless, to facilitate the understanding
of the results and discussion, we summarized the basic
terminology in Table B2 in the supplementary material.
4.4. fsQCA and calibration
Crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA), spe-
cifically, an early developed version with dichotomy, was
first introduced by Charles Ragin in 1987 (Ragin 2008).
As csQCA was criticized by using binary-value data,
fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) allows the researcher to establish
differences in degree through a fuzzy membership score
(Schneider and Rohlfing 2013). Themembership score is
usually generated by calibration, and this crucial process
should be transparent, open and replicable (Ragin 2006).
The fuzzy membership score of our four conditions was
a four-value scheme with ‘0’, ‘0.33’, ‘0.67”, and ‘1.0’ to
indicate ‘fully out,’ ‘more out than in,’ ‘more in than out,’
and ‘fully in’, respectively. Since the household involve-
ment is more complicated, the fuzzy membership scores
of household involvement employed a six-value scheme,
with values of ‘0’, ‘0.2’, ‘0.4’, ‘0.6’, ‘0.8’ and ‘1.0’. Similarly,
the fuzzy membership outcome scores were categorized
with a four-value scheme to indicate ‘forest’, ‘sparse
forest’, ‘developing forest or grass’ and ‘re-farm’.
Theoretical knowledge and empirical insight were
used to generate the fuzzy membership scores of each
condition by using a measure. The selection of the mea-
sure followed the structural calibration procedure sug-
gested by Basurto and Speer (2012). Each condition was
explained by a measure, and each measure corresponds
to a survey question (Table 3). The full dataset can be
found in table B1, and details of the calibration process
are summarized in table B3 in the supplementary
material.
Table 3. Measure of condition.
Condition Measure Survey question
Household Involvement Involvement in general planning Were you involved in the program general plan in the village?
Involvement in tree selection Were you involved in the tree species selection for your own enrolled land?
Involvement in site selection Were you involved in the site selection for your own enrolled land?
Satisfaction Were you satisfied with the tree and spot selected for your SLCP enrolled land?
Property rights Tree ownership Do you think you own the tree under the payment?
Tree disposition Do you think you own the tree after the payment?
Land ownership Do you think you own the enrolled land?
Off-farm labor allocation Income structure How much is your land-related income?
How much is your total income?
Effective monitoring Checking standard Do you understand the checking standard?
Monitoring Have you been regularly monitored by a local official?
Inspection Did the provincial or national official inspect your SLCP enrolled land?
Financial incentive Recognition of attractiveness Do you feel the payment is attractive compared to the input that is required?
322 C. CHEN ET AL.
5. Results
5.1. Monitoring of environmental effects
In Jingyuan, ecological planting (species that provide
ecological services, compared to fruits and nuts) has
been fully implemented due to longer payment, as the
local government promoted. Local forest experts told us
that ecological trees grow better on SLCP-enrolled land
in Jingyuan, which has poor soil fertility. Inappropriate
choices of tree species were made in the first few years,
given the study region’s low water availability and harsh
winter (König et al. 2014), and replanting was con-
ducted every year to fill the gaps left by dead trees.
Thus, local governments, on behalf of the program,
asked the households or hired local laborers to partici-
pate in replanting. Years later, due to many rounds of
replanting, a mixed plantation of many indigenous
species was established by the households. However,
many households complained that the payment was
greatly reduced due to the replanting.
A majority of trees on the ground are less than 3
meters tall, with low coverage (Table 4) and low density
(Table 5). Most of our observation plots are at the early
stage of forest development. The average self-reported
tree survival rate is 65.4%, while the field-checked tree
survival rate5 is 40.46% (Table 5). Both figures are much
lower than the official 85% standard, implying that
there may be a serious problem with tree management.
Sixteen of 59 households had delivery of a qualified
‘ecological forest’, and they will be entitled to annual
compensation by categorizing their forest into
a national public forest. Forty-three households had
not achieved the expecting environmental outcome,
and 9 households had reconverted their SLCP-
enrolled land back to agricultural use.
5.2. Pathway to success
We assumed that the presence of household involve-
ment, property rights, off-farm labor allocation, effec-
tive monitoring and sufficient financial incentive is
relevant for environmental success.
5.2.1. Necessary conditions
For this study, we used a consistency score of 0.90 as
a threshold for accepting a condition as being necessary,
as suggested by Schneider and Wagemann (2010). The
analysis showed that all consistency scores are below the
threshold with an exception that the condition of
effective monitoring (0.897683) is very close to 0.9,
indicating that effective monitoring is likely the neces-
sary condition for success.
5.2.2. Sufficient conditions
By performing a sufficiency analysis, we sought to
determine which individual conditions or combina-
tion of conditions would be sufficient for achieving
the outcome. All 59 cases were used to build the
crisp-set truth table, with 24 rows (figure C4 in the
supplementary material). The outcome value of each
row was determined. We found a clear gap between
the outcome consistencies of 0.82 and 0.79 (marked
as red in figure C4); therefore, we used the natural
break of 0.8 as the threshold. QCA is a case-oriented
method and is very sensitive to case. To avoid over-
interpretation, we set the frequency at 2. Thus, five
rows were considered successful and 19 rows unsuc-
cessful (figure C4). We identified two solution terms
for sufficient conditions for success (Table 6). The
verification of the QCA solutions for inconsistencies
and noncoverage can be found in A3 in the supple-
mentary material.
Accordingly, the results of our sufficiency analysis
are graphically displayed through an XY plot (Figure 3)
that can be used to visualize how consistent a given
combination of conditions is with the statement of
being a sufficient condition. The axes show the fuzzy-
set membership scores of the cases in the set of condi-
tion X and the outcome Y. For sufficiency, each case’s
fuzzy-set membership score in X must be equal to or
less than its fuzzy-set membership in Y. In other words,
almost all cases falling above the main diagonal would
indicate a sufficient relation. In this figure, most cases
are above or on the bisecting line.
5.3 Pathway to failure
Similar to our analysis of environmental success, we
assumed that the absence of household involvement,
property rights, effective monitoring or financial
incentive is relevant for environmental failure.
However, the effect of off-farm labor allocation is
not clear in the literature. Therefore, we retained
both on-farm labor allocation and off-farm labor
allocation in the assumption. The condition code
was marked with a tilde (~), indicating the status of
absent.
Table 4. Coverage of 128 SLCP-enrolled 100 m2 quadrat.
SLCP scale Coverage ratio Number of plots Percentage
Forest 20%-100% 23 18%
Sparse-forest 10%-20% 16 12.5%
Developing-forest 5%-10% 27 21.1%
Grassland 0–5 49 38.3%
Re-farm 0 13 10.2%
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of tree number and survival
rate of 128 SLCP-enrolled 100 m2 quadrat.
Number of trees Survival rate
Mean 13.75 40.46%
Standard Deviation 10.27 0.26
Minimum 0 0
Maximum 78 1
Count 128 128
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5.3.1. Necessary conditions
The analysis of necessary conditions of environmen-
tal failure indicated that none of the five conditions
was necessary for the outcome.
5.3.2. Sufficient conditions
We use the intermediate solution as a result because it
balances parsimony and complexity via the injection of
additional theoretical knowledge into the analysis.
Again, we set 0.8 as the threshold according to the
natural break (marked as red in figure C5 in the supple-
mentary material) and set the frequency at 2. Thus, we
identified three solution terms for sufficient conditions
for failure (Table 7). The verification of the QCA solu-
tions for inconsistencies and noncoverage can be found
in A4 in the supplementary material.
6. Discussion
6.1 Conditions for environmental effectiveness
According to the necessary condition analysis, consis-
tency of effective monitoring is very close to the
threshold, indicating that monitoring is practically the
only necessary condition for an environmental success
at the household level. The results of our sufficient
condition analysis indicate that the combination of
certain conditions rather than a single condition alone
is crucial for environmental effectiveness. The results
reveal one main path and one complementary path,
which include both socioeconomic and institutional
conditions. The two different paths can independently
lead to environmental effectiveness (multiple conjunc-
tural causation).
Each path contains the combination of household
involvement and effective monitoring, illuminating
them as a fundamental combination. This combination
can create platforms for negotiation and capacity-
building between stakeholders. Both social systems
and ecosystems are nonstatic, and the governmental
PES needs to cope with abrupt change. Specifically,
a reforestation program such as the SLCP requires
closely cooperating stakeholders who deal with general
planning, location and tree species selection, and pro-
blem solving. The initiation of SLCP includes choosing
saplings, planting at the right time, digging a good-sized
Table 6. Sufficient conditions for success: complex solution.
Term Solution Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency Covered household number
1 invo*moni*fina 0.708494 0.411583 0.851113 3, 4, 8, 13, 15, 19, 23, 24,29, 33, 35, 39, 43, 44, 52, 55, 56, 57
2 invo*moni*prop*off 0.335135 0.038224 0.843538 4, 8, 16, 17, 39, 52
Model: out = f(part, prop, off, moni, fina)
Solution coverage: 0.746718, Solution consistency: 0.823329
Frequency cutoff: 2.000000, Consistency cutoff: 0.824345
0
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Figure 3. XY plot of solution for sufficient condition invo*moni*fina + invo*moni*prop*off.
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hole and keeping the soil moist. Failure of any of these
factors can lead to extensive tree death, poor growth, or
a decline after planting. The fundamental combination
urges the households to manage their saplings at an
early stage, establishing a strong resistance to later
environmental challenges such as open livestock graz-
ing, drought, cold and rodent damage. For example,
2007 saw the coldest winter in Jingyuan in the last
decade, and massive damage to trees occurred.
Therefore, long-lasting household involvement and
effective monitoring are needed for both initiation and
follow-up replanting. Our results confirm the hypoth-
esis that PES schemes that are serious about involve-
ment and monitoring will also tend to perform better
with respect to their environmental outcomes (Ezzine-
de-Blas et al. 2016). Nevertheless, environmental suc-
cess can only be expected from the occurrence of
a fundamental combination with either 1) a financial
incentive or 2) both property rights and off-farm labor
allocation.
6.1.1. Path 1: the combination of household
involvement, effective monitoring and financial
incentives
Due to the high coverage (14 of 16 successful house-
holds), path 1 is the main path to environmental
success. It shows that the fundamental combination
has to be consistent with financial incentives. As
primary incentive, payment is important for the
properly initiated households to maintain their
efforts. In contrast, payment to those who failed to
pass the checking standard can be largely deducted
and use to contribute to replanting costs. This path
can focus the households’ incentive away from one-
time behavior and towards long-lasting efforts by
creating a positive feedback loop.
Notably, clear property rights and off-farm labor
allocation are missing in the combination, which has
challenged many studies (Uchida et al. 2009; Tu et al.
2011) by showing that clear property rights and off-
farm labor allocation are irrelevant for the main path to
environmental success. In Jingyuan County, local
employment opportunities are limited and unstable.
Most off-farm employment is physical work in the
construction and service sector. This kind of employ-
ment often has no contract and is excluded from the
social security system. The households covered by this
path showed varied recognition of property rights. Only
3 of 14 successful households could explicitly recognize
a property right. Therefore, we argue that the instability
of off-farm work in poor areas and the vagueness of
property rights in rural villages may undermine the two
important conditions for environmental effectiveness.
6.1.2. Path 2: the combination of household
involvement, effective monitoring, clear property
rights and off-farm labor allocation
The second path shows that environmental effectiveness
can also be expected in the presence of a fundamental
combination together with clear property rights and off-
farm labor allocation. Complementary to the main path,
this path describes how to reach environmental success
for a special group of off-farm households. Although
a majority of the income came from off-farm employ-
ment and their dependency on the land was increas-
ingly weak, the three successful households covered by
path 2 (household numbers 4, 8, and 52) hold strong
concerns about the risk of unemployment. Therefore,
they wanted to strengthen their ownership of the trees
and the land as a safeguard.
The financial incentive is not a component of the
path for off-farm households, although three success-
ful households had two ‘0.67’ and one ‘1’ in the value
scheme of the financial incentive. Due to the incon-
sistent cases (household numbers 16, 17, and 39), the
logic minimization procedure treated financial incen-
tive as an irrelevant condition. While the payment
was important at the early initiation stage, three suc-
cessful households told us that this importance was
increasingly weak as time passed. As off-farm
employment has recently dominated total income,
the payment of SLCP was only viewed as ‘icing on
the cake’. Therefore, we argue that it is not necessary
to add a financial incentive to the combination.
6.2 Conditions for the failure of environmental
effectiveness
Similar to the conditions for environmental effectiveness,
failure can occur from a combination of certain condi-
tions rather than single conditions alone. Additionally,
asymmetrical causation was also observed. Conversely,
the presence of certain conditions linking with environ-
mental effectiveness does not imply that their absence
links with failure.
In the absence of certain conditions, the SLCP may
become either business as usual or a form of welfare
entitlement. In particular, household noninvolvement
Table 7. Sufficient condition intermediate solution. Assumptions: ~fina (absent) ~moni (absent) ~prop (absent) ~part (absent).
Term Solution Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency Covered household number
1 ~off*~invo 0.511783 0.172508 0.870504 6,12,20,21,26,27,28,32,37,38,41,45,47,48,49,51,53,54,58
2 ~prop*~invo 0.434441 0.048640 0.892613 5,6,7,14,26,27,28,37,40,41,49,51,59
3 fina*~moni*~prop 0.322054 0.073112 0.889816 5,6,9,28,36,37,41,46,50,59
Model: out = f(~part, ~ prop, ~ off, ~ moni, ~ fina)
Solution coverage: 0.680061, Solution consistency: 0.873836
Frequency cutoff: 2.000000, Consistency cutoff: 0.816568
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occurred in paths 1 and 2, showing that when program
implementation was informed rather than discussed
with households, their environmental effectiveness
may be harmed at the household level. As Bennett
(2008) found, incomplete involvement may place
some households in an unfair situation in terms of
resource distribution. Indeed, some households com-
plained that the saplings they received were bad quality
compared with those households who kept a close rela-
tionship with local forest officials. Corresponding to
section 6.1, household involvement plays a large role
in determining both success and failure of environmen-
tal effectiveness.
A negative effect of off-farm labor allocation was not
found in any of the three paths, which challenges the
argument that off-farm labor allocation may endanger
tree management due to time conflict or geographic
mismatch between city-based off-farm employment and
village-based forests (Bennett et al. 2011; Li et al. 2017). In
Jingyuan County, most off-farm laborers commute
between the construction sites and the villages by motor-
cycle. The short distance does not place the on-farm and
off-farm work in contradiction. Thus, off-farm labor
allocation may not play a role in the failure of environ-
mental effectiveness.
6.2.1. Path 1: the combination of household
noninvolvement and on-farm labor allocation
Households covered by this path have continued their
dependence on farming and lost the chance to diversify
their income. Many scholars assumed that it is more
likely that the on-farm labor allocating households and
relatively poor households will reconvert some of the
SLCP forest back to farming when the program ends
(Grosjean and Kontoleon 2009). The households cov-
ered by this path confirmed this assumption; five house-
holds had already reconverted some of the SLCP forest
back to sapling nursery or forage (alfalfa) planting. Our
results reflect the assumption of Barbier (2010) of
a ‘poverty-environment trap’ in developing countries,
where the relationship between poverty and natural
resource degradation is affected by the people’s access
to outside employment. Households covered by this
path may be resistant to both sapling initiation and
repeated replanting because they distrust the imple-
mentation process and they simply need the land for
agricultural use. Therefore, we argue that an environ-
mental failure can be expected in the presence of house-
hold noninvolvement and on-farm labor allocation,
where distrust, initiation failure, poor replanting and
farm dependency are all mutually reinforcing.
6.2.2. Path 2: the combination of poor property
rights and household noninvolvement
The combination of household noninvolvement and
poor property rights can also lead to failure. While
half of the covered households of the second path
overlapped with the first path due to the presence of
household noninvolvement, it is interesting to notice
the appearance of poor property rights. To date, forest
tenure reform allocated forestland to households but
caused more ambiguity about forest ownership (He
et al. 2014). Households covered by this path have
doubts about their property rights and hardly consider
the enrolled land their property, discouraging them
from managing the forest appropriately in the long
term. Similarly, in Vietnam (Kolinjivadi and
Sunderland 2012), Cambodia (Clements et al. 2010),
and Indonesia (Fauzi and Anna 2013), the implementa-
tion of governmental PES has been challenged by the
lack of well-defined property rights, raising a question
about the suitability of PES as a suitable tool in some
developing countries.
6.2.3. Path 3: the combination of financial
incentive, weak monitoring and poor property
rights
This path may be viewed by households as a form of
welfare entitlement or a profitable cheating strategy.
Particularly when the payment is attractive, monitoring
is not in place and property rights are not clear, house-
holds consider the SLCP compensation instead of con-
ditional payment. Our results are supported by the
study of Ezzine-de-Blas et al. (2016), who found that
governmental PES schemes that are perceived to be ill-
monitored will often eventually lead to widespread
noncompliance.
The trade-off effect of financial incentives is
worth mentioning, since it is a component of
a successful path and a failed path. It may be con-
sidered an inconsistency by the regression analysis,
but it is absolutely normal in the QCA analysis. The
multiple conjunctural causation of QCA allows one
condition to have different impacts on the outcome,
depending on its combination with other conditions.
Therefore, when combining with different condi-
tions, financial incentives can trigger not only suc-
cess but also failure.
6.3 Policy implications
Our study could be a reference to improve the govern-
mental PES programs. Governmental PES has great
potential to create significant economies of scale and
cost efficiencies when compared to other types of PES
(Engel et al. 2008). However, the tremendous invest-
ment from the state does not necessarily guarantee the
expected environmental outcome. Attention should be
given to understanding the combined effect of condi-
tions on PES program goals. Several studies have pre-
sented certain design features and synthesized some
common conditions for PES (Sattler and Matzdorf
2013). However, most existing studies consider the
various conditions individually and independently.
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Notably, Meyer et al. (2015) first showed that combina-
tions of certain design rules influenced the success of
a governmental payment scheme in Germany.
Similarly, our SLCP study shows that the combination
effect of certain conditions rather than single conditions
alone should be considered. In particular, for
a successful reforestation program, household involve-
ment, effective monitoring and financial incentives
should be present in a combination.While reforestation
requires continuous management with a trustable
reward system, this combination can foster a positive
feedback loop by building long-lasting cooperation
between households and government. The present of
both socioeconomic and institutional conditions shows
that interaction of socioeconomic and institutional con-
ditions may have a direct impact on the environmental
outcome. However, the interactions discussed in this
paper are by no means an exhaustive description of the
complex set of interrelationships between socioeco-
nomic, institutional and environmental dimensions.
We therefore call for more attention to combination
effects when designing a PES scheme.
Our study provided new empirical evidence that
is relevant for SLCP policymakers. First, our field
observation was in agreement with the claim that
environmental effectiveness decreased to thresholds
below those stipulated for payment. Second, the
effect of labor allocation is clear in our results. On
the one hand, off-farm labor allocation is the key
component of the complementary path to success.
On the other hand, households who continued their
dependence on farming may be trapped in poverty.
Third, the income structure change does not make
those off-farm households relax their property right
claims to their SLCP land and trees. Therefore, the
strength of property rights is needed in future poli-
cies, especially for those off-farm households who
successfully developed the trees. In late 2016, the
central government decided to terminate the pay-
ment (State Forest Administration 2016). From 2017
onward, the successfully established ‘ecological for-
est’ could be categorized as a national public forest,
which is entitled to annual compensation. The suc-
cessfully established ‘economic forest’ can be devel-
oped with the under-forest economy (agroforestry)
and even allowed to be cut down if permitted by
a local authority (State Forest Administration 2016).
However, the termination did not offer a solution to
those households who failed to meet the evaluation
standard. Therefore, timely policies should be made
to address these ‘excluded’ households by guiding
them from previously failed paths to successful
paths. In particular, the combination effect of house-
hold involvement and governmental monitoring
can help households break down institutional
constraints.
6.4 Methodological discussion
The Braun-Blanquet method was used to evaluate the
canopy coverage of SLCP-enrolled plots as an indicator
of environmental outcomes. Similar to other ecological
study methods for vegetation analysis, the result
depends on the time of the field visit. For instance,
deciduous trees may have different coverage in different
seasons. Moreover, the difference in tree species can
influence the result. For example, broadleaf trees (e.g.
black locust and Elm) in general have larger coverage
than do coniferous trees (e.g. dahurian larch and pine).
In our study region, both broadleaf trees and coniferous
trees were mixed planted, and trees were qualitatively
different due to different planting times. Therefore, we
consider that the Braun-Blanquet method is a better
tool to compare survival rates.
Our results confirm thatQCAhas the advantage in the
identification of necessary and sufficient conditions and
multiple conjunctural causation.However, disadvantages
of QCA, including reduced case numbers, limited causal
conditions (Rihoux and Lobe 2009), subjective condition
selection and imperfect calibration (Basurto and Speer
2012), have also been observed. Similar to other case-
oriented studies, fsQCA faces the same challenge that
only a limited number of cases and conditions can be
considered if one wants to draw valid inferences. High
numbers of conditions might be dysfunctional for QCA,
just as in garbage can statistical models, where too many
independent variables ‘destroy’ the results (Schneider and
Wagemann 2010). As is always true in QCA, the number
of cases is equal to 2k, where K is the number of condi-
tions included in the study. Our number of cases is 59,
and our number of conditions is 5, which are suitable for
the QCA application. Moreover, the selection of condi-
tions has a strong impact on the research result; therefore,
strong arguments are required to avoid subjectivity
(Sehring et al, 2013). In our SLCP study, the conditions
were selected and defined based on theoretical knowledge
and an extensive participatory process. However, several
important conditions (e.g. trust andnorm)were excluded
from our final five conditions. Authors must constantly
justify their choices and make them transparent (Table
B1). As a key part of fsQCA, calibration is essential to the
reliability and replicability of the result. Therefore, it
needs to be done carefully and documented clearly and
in detail. We kept the selection and calibration of condi-
tions transparent (Table B3) and open to criticism. We
thus believe that this openness has helped to balance the
subjectivity inevitably involved in any qualitative
research.
As a ‘middle road’ between quantitative and qua-
litative strategies (Rihoux 2003), QCA may go beyond
them by making systematic comparisons while still
taking into account the single case (Meyer et al.
2018). Despite being a well-established tool for policy
research, the application of QCA in the field of
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environmental governance is rare. As the potentials
and limits of QCA were reflected by our SLCP study
case, the added value of QCA as an alternative or
complementary method to conventional research
approaches might be discovered. The advantages of
QCA may be especially relevant in terms of research
on PES, which requires a better integration of rela-
tions between institutional, socioeconomic and envir-
onmental issues (Meyer et al. 2018).
7. Conclusions
In this study, we examined two major aspects. First, the
paths of socioeconomic and institutional conditions to
environmental effectiveness of the SLCP at the house-
hold level were revealed. Specifically, the linkage
between two interrelated datasets of socioeconomic
and institutional conditions and field-observed envir-
onmental outcomes were directly explored. Second, our
study is the pioneering work to use fsQCA in environ-
mental governance research for PES, and the added
value of QCA might be discovered. By correctly reflect-
ing its potentials and limits through empirical applica-
tion, we call for a more serious reflection on the added
value of QCA as an alternative or complementary
method to conventional research approaches.
Our field observation data from 128 SLCP-enrolled
plots are arguably one of the few datasets thus far avail-
able for SLCP field-observed evaluation.We show that 16
of 59 households had successfully implemented the SLCP
and that 9 households had reconverted their SLCP-
enrolled land back to agricultural use. The success and
failure in terms of environmental effectiveness can be
expected based on the combination of certain conditions
rather than single conditions alone. Our results revealed
one main path and one complementary path, either of
which can independently lead to environmental success.
As replantingwas annually conducted to replace the dead
trees in some areas, long-lasting incentives in situations
with effective monitoring appear to be critical for the
environmental outcome. The pathways to failure in
environmental effectiveness were more complicated.
The first and second paths were considered business as
usual, and the third path was viewed as a form of welfare
entitlement or a profitable cheating strategy. We found
that financial incentives have a trade-off effect, as they can
not only create a positive interaction but also trigger
failure in situations with different conditions.
Notes
1. At the household level, environmental effects were
measured by the tree survival rate (counting the trunks
3–5 years after the saplings are planted), tree species
and canopy coverage. At the regional and national
levels, environmental effects were measured by the
increase in forest area and forest cover.
2. Necessary and sufficient conditions refer to QCA ter-
minology; please see section 3.3 and Table B2.
3. The outcome and the negation of the outcome should
always be analyzed in two separate QCA analyses.
4. In the early 1980s, through forest tenure reform, most
collective forests in rural China came under the man-
agement of individual households.
5. We checked the survival rate according to the official
standard, which uses number of survived trees divided by
number of planted seeds or seeding (666.67 m2 = 220
seeds/seeding) after a 3 to 5-year period from time of
planting. The first planting was in 2000, but the re-
planting was annually repeated until 2013. The survival
rate was measured in 2015, which is three years after the
latest re-planting and close to the end of the program.
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